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1. Introduction. 
 
Our procedure here is to try to reconstruct a typical bank portfolio for a country and 
then, holding the presumed loan book unchanged over time, (i.e. replacing failed 
loans with loans of a similar quality), to examine how the loan ratings would have 
shifted, and hence how the capital adequacy requirements (CAR’s) for the banks 
would have varied over time; for other similar exercises see Kashyap and Stein 
(2003 and 2004) and Gordy and Howells (2004).  To do this we use Moody’s data on 
U.S. corporate bonds, included on Moody’s Investors Service, Credit Risk Calculator.  
We can only do this exercise for those countries for which Moody’s data on credit 
ratings has a long enough time series.  Unfortunately this rules out most large 
European countries since adequate Moody’s data only go back to 1988 for the U.K., 
2001 for Germany; 2002 for France; 2003 for Italy; 2002 for Spain.  In practice we 
also used data provided by the Mexican Financial Regulatory Agency and the 
Norwegian Central Bank on Corporate Loans for these latter two countries. The 
Mexican data incorporates statistics between 1995 and 2000 and the Norwegian data 
incorporates statistics between 1988 and 2001. 
 
For an earlier exercise along these same lines, and using the same Mexican data 
set, see Segoviano and Lowe, (2002). Amongst the problems are how to reconstruct 
a `typical’ bank portfolio; whether, and how, to deal with the problem of failing loans 
dropping out of the portfolio; and what account to take of the fact that Basel II is a 
regime change that may make banks alter their `typical’ behaviour.  Very briefly, we 
reconstructed a typical bank portfolio as follows. We assumed that each portfolio 
consisted of 1000 loans, each one with equal exposure. From each country’s data 
sources, we obtained the through time proportion of assets (bonds for the U.S. or 
corporate loans for Mexico and Norway) that were classified under each of the 
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reported ratings for a given country.  With this information we constructed the 
benchmark portfolio that we used to compute capital requirements at each point in 
time.  
 
By assuming that the initial bank loan book remains unchanged throughout, this is 
equivalent to assuming that failed loans are replaced by loans of similar initial quality.  
This is what Kashyap and Stein (2004) did, and seems natural.  Gordy and Howells 
(2004) argue, however, that banks will aim for a higher quality portfolio during 
recessions, and thus will replace failing loans with credits of higher, than initial, 
quality.  At the macro level it is hard, in most countries, to see where the supply of 
such higher quality loans would come from during recessions; in discussion of this 
point at a BIS Conference in May 2004, Michael Gordy noted that in the USA high 
quality companies tended to shift their borrowing from capital markets, e.g. the 
commercial paper market, to banks during recessions.  In any case, since risk 
spreads on lower quality loans widen during recessions, any extra benefit to the bank 
would be slight. So we feel relatively comfortable about our own assumption. 
 
The results of this exercise for the three countries examined are stark.  We compared 
the implied capital requirements for our `typical’ bank under three regulatory regimes; 
first the standardised approach in Basel II, (which is close to that applied in Basel I); 
second, the Foundations IRB approach, (i.e. assuming a constant Loss Given 
Default, since we have no good time series in any country for average LGD); and 
third, an Improved Credit Risk Method (ICRM).  This latter uses a Merton approach to 
model credit quality changes and an indirect approach to model correlations amongst 
the individual credits in the overall portfolio. The construction of an ICRM is, however, 
quite complex. The main addition in this note, beyond our associated work, available 
at Goodhart, Hofmann and Segoviano (2004), is that we spell out in more detail here 
how we do the exercise of estimating the required capital requirements under an 
Improved Credit Risk Method (ICRM).  
 
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we elaborate on the need to 
measure portfolio effects for proper credit risk quantification. In section 3, we develop 
the ICRM. In section 4, we present the empirical implementation and results. This 
section also describes the data and assumptions made to perform the exercise. 
Finally, our conclusions are summarised in section 5. 
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2. Why a portfolio Approach? 
Since the quality of the credit portfolio of a bank can change at any time in the future, 
there is a need to make frequent calculations of the expected losses that a bank 
could suffer under different risk situations. This analysis of uncertainty is the essence 
of risk management. Therefore, measuring the uncertainty or variability of loss and 
the related likelihood of the possible levels of unexpected losses in a bank’s portfolio 
is fundamental to the effective management of credit risk. Sufficient earnings should 
be generated through adequate pricing and provisioning to absorb any expected 
loss. However, economic capital should be available to cover unexpected credit 
default losses, because the actual level of credit losses suffered in anyone period 
could be significantly higher than the expected level. The estimation of the profit and 
loss distribution of credit portfolios, from which the unexpected losses can be 
identified (e.g. 99.9 Percentile loss level), represents the issue to be addressed in 
this document. 
 
Figure 1: Credit Portfolio Profit and Loss Distribution (P&L). 
 
Portfolio Losses 
 
 
The adoption of the portfolio approach to risk analysis (Markowitz (1959)) has been 
amply documented and adopted in numerous finance applications1. Under this 
theory, investors seek an optimal risk-return relationship when formulating their 
investment portfolio. 
 
                                                
1 See Cochrane (2001) for numerous examples on asset pricing. 
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The model presented in this paper provides a methodology for assessing portfolio 
risk due to changes in loan value caused by changes in obligor (ie. borrower’s) credit 
quality. Changes in value are caused not only by possible defaults, but also by 
upgrades and downgrades in credit quality; the correlation of credit quality variations 
across obligors in the portfolio is also considered. This allows us to calculate the 
benefits of diversification in the portfolio. Credit risk modellers have already 
developed risk management techniques that seek to take account of this portfolio 
diversification effect2. In this paper we present a modification to the “Credit-Metrics” 
and KMV methodologies that have been used to simulate unexpected losses from 
credit risk in analysed portfolios. For detailed exposition refer to the Credit-Metrics 
and KMV technical documents. We refer to our modification to the “Credit-Metrics” 
and KMV methodologies as an Improved Credit Risk Model: ICRM3. 
 
3. An Improved Credit Risk Method (ICRM). 
 
As already stated, our model assesses portfolio risk arising from changes in loan 
value caused by changes in obligor credit quality. Given the composition of a 
particular portfolio, all the possible portfolio values and their probabilities are 
recorded in the profit and loss (P&L) distribution of the portfolio. This distribution 
records both, increases and decreases in the value of the portfolio caused by the 
upgrades and downgrades in the loans’ credit qualities. The modelling of the Profit 
and Loss distribution of the portfolio (P&L) can be broken down into the following 
steps: 
 
3.1 Modeling the distribution of a single loan. 
 3.1.1 Credit risk migration and the Merton approach. 
 3.1.2 Loan valuation.  
 
3.2 Portfolio risk calculation. 
3.2.1 Joint probabilities. 
 3.2.2 Indirect approach to model correlations. 
3.2.3 Simulation of quality scenarios for the credit portfolio. 
 3.2.3 Valuation, P&L distribution and unexpected losses. 
                                                
2Such approaches may be subject to further improvements, but it is not our intention have to suggest 
possible improvements to each methodology. 
3 The term “Improved” refers to the fact that this model does take account of the benefits of 
diversification. This is in contrast to the IRB approaches that use a “simplified, single risk factor 
model” See Secretariat of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, (2001). 
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3.1 Modelling the distribution of a single loan. 
 
 
3.1.1 Credit Risk Migration and the Merton Approach. 
 
The Merton approach assumes that a firm’s equity can be viewed as a call option on 
the firm’s assets with a strike price equal to the book value of the firm’s debts (Merton 
(1974)). The intuition behind this assumption is that, given the limited liability of 
equity, equity holders have the right, but not the obligation to payoff debt-holders and 
take over the remaining assets of the firm. This approach implies that the credit 
quality (rating) of a given debtor is related to the difference between the market value 
of its assets and its debt. 
 
Under this approach, the change in the value of the assets of a given company is 
related to the change in its rating. So, the distribution of the company’s asset returns 
can be used to calculate the distribution of the probability of the firm’s rating change. 
For the generalisation of this model, it is necessary to include, in addition to the 
default state, different credit quality states. This is because in this model, risk comes 
not only from default but also from changes in value due to up(down) grades.  
 
Figure2: The Distribution of Assets’ Returns. 
AE CD B
Z e Z d Z c Z b
 
 
The likelihood of any credit rating migration in the coming period is conditioned on 
the current credit rating of the obligor.  
 
Individual likelihoods of migration are usually represented in matrix form. This table is 
called a transition matrix. The transition matrix is the table that summarises the 
migration probabilities from one credit quality to any other. 
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Table1: Transition Matrix. 
 A B C D E 
A 0.865047 0.054462 0.011523 0.002826 0.002439
B 0.057558 0.806042 0.106912 0.006859 0.014964
C 0.005934 0.052618 0.812763 0.060135 0.065386
D 0.001516 0.009098 0.058378 0.708470 0.222538
E 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000001 0.999999
 
To read this table, the credit rating (today) at time t0 is written on the extreme left column. The possible 
ratings to which a given loan can migrate at the risk horizon, t1 are written on the top row. For example, 
a loan that at t0 is rated as C has 81.2763% probability of remaining in the same rating at t1. The table 
indicates that there is a 6.0135% probability that the loan will migrate to a D rating at t1 and there is a 
6.5386% probability that the loan will default (column E) at t1. The transition matrix also indicates that 
there is a 5.2618% that the loan will migrate to a B rating and so on. 
 
Having the transition probabilities between different credit qualities, and employing 
the Merton Approach, it is possible to derive the (market) value of assets that 
represent the cut-off values between different credit qualities, as shown in Figure 1. 
These cut-off values fulfil the condition that if the change in the market value of the 
asset (r) is sufficiently negative, (i.e. smaller than Ze), then the credit falls into 
default; if Ze < r < Zd, the credit is rated D, and so on. Taking into consideration the 
empirical transition matrix, the cut-off values are obtained by solving the following 
equations (e.g. for a loan initially rated as X): 
 
Prob(E|X) = Prob(r < Ze) = ϕ(Ze)       (1) 
Prob(D|X) = Prob(Ze <r < Zd) = ϕ(Zd) - ϕ(Ze) 
Prob(C|X) = Prob(Zd <r < Zc) = ϕ( Zc) - ϕ(Zd) 
Prob(B|X) = Prob(Zc <r < Zb) = ϕ(Zb) - ϕ(Zc) 
Prob(A|X) = Prob(Zb <r < Za) = 1 - ϕ(Zb) 
 
Where, R is the implied market value of assets, and ϕ is the Normal Cumulative 
Density Function (CDF). 
 
 
3.1.2 Valuation.  
 
In the previous section, we determined the likelihoods of migration to any of the 
possible credit quality states at a given risk horizon. In this section, the values at the 
risk horizon for these credit quality states are determined. Values are calculated for 
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each migration state. These valuations fall into two categories. First, in the event of 
up(down) grades, only the change in the value of the bond due to migration is 
considered. To obtain the values at the risk horizon corresponding to rating 
up(down)grades, a straightforward present value re-valuation is performed. This 
revaluation upon up(down)grade accounts for the decreasing likelihood that the full 
amount of the loan will be repaid as the obligor undergoes rating downgrades, and 
the increasing likelihood of repayment if the obligor is upgraded. Second, in the event 
of default, the change in the value of the loan due to its downgrade (to the default 
category) is estimated in the same manner; however, the remaining value of the loan 
is multiplied by its loss given default (LGD)4. 
 
Table2: Valuation Table. 
 A B C D E 
A 0.000000 -0.012525 -0.062947 -0.220099 -0.997560
B 0.012525 0.000000 -0.050422 -0.207575 -0.985035
C 0.062947 0.050422 0.000000 -0.157152 -0.934613
D 0.220099 0.207575 0.157152 0.000000 -0.777461
E 0.997560 0.985035 0.934613 0.777461 0.000000
 
To read this table, the credit rating (today) at time t0 is written on the extreme left column. The possible 
ratings to which a given loan can migrate at the risk horizon, t1, are written on the top row.  Changes in 
the value of the loan due to migration are in the body of the table. For example, if a loan that at t0 is 
rated as C, remains at the same rating at t1, has a zero present value change. If the same loan migrated 
to a D rating, its present value would be decreased 15.71%. If the loan were upgraded to a B rating, its 
present value would be increased 5.04%, and so on. This re-valuation upon downgrades/upgrades 
accounts for the decreasing/increasing likelihood that the full amount of the loan will be repaid as the 
obligor undergoes migrations. 
 
As already stated, given a current credit rating of the obligor the likelihood of any 
credit rating migration in the coming period is conditioned on the current credit rating 
of the obligor.  
 
With the transition probabilities indicated by the transition matrix and the possible 
values within each migration state indicated by the valuation table, it is possible to 
obtain the value distribution for each exposure on a stand-alone-basis. Beyond this, 
portfolio credit risk models5 then extend this framework to the portfolio as a whole, in 
order to obtain the distribution of value of the complete portfolio, the so called profit 
                                                
4 The loss given default is estimated as LGD= 1-(percentage of recovery value). When databases allow 
it, the recovery rates and consequently, the LGD’s are estimated based on loan characteristics, e.g. 
credit quality of debtor, geographical area, etc. 
5 See CreditMetrics (1997) and CreditRisk+ (1997) technical documents for specific details. 
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and loss distribution (P&L) from which we will derive the Value at Risk (VaR) figure 
used to define capital requirements. 
 
 
3.2 Portfolio risk calculation. 
 
In section I, we explained the steps followed to obtain the credit risk for a stand-alone 
exposure. Here we extend the methodology to a “portfolio”. For reasons of parsimony 
the methodology explained here will refer to a portfolio of just two exposures; 
however, the methodology applies to a portfolio of any number of elements. In 
general, the necessary steps are the same as in the previous section, but there is 
one significant addition. Now it becomes necessary to include the contribution to risk 
brought about by the effects of credit quality correlations. So, first, we will discuss the 
joint likelihoods of credit quality co-movements. Second, we extend the credit risk 
calculation for the stand-alone exposure to the multiple exposure case. 
 
 
3.2.1 Joint likelihood in credit quality. 
 
Understanding joint likelihoods allow us to account properly for portfolio 
diversification effects. Correlations determine how often losses occur in multiple 
exposures at the same time. The portfolio value volatility (risk) will be lower if 
correlations between credit events are lower. 
 
In theory, a correlation matrix of changes of credit quality between creditors can be 
computed by developing an explanatory model of the changes in the value of the 
assets of the borrowers. This approach presents several practical problems for 
implementation, the most important being the handling of very large correlation 
matrices. Additionally, it is not possible to obtain the changes in the market value of 
assets for each particular borrower, since it would be necessary to have specific 
information about the internal financial structure of each borrower. These two 
disadvantages make it impossible to implement an ideal correlation matrix; for these 
reasons we will adopt an indirect (but more manageable) method to introduce the 
portfolio diversification effect.  
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3.2.2 Indirect approach to model Correlations. 
 
The referred indirect method for introducing the portfolio diversification effect was first 
presented in Segoviano (1998). It is based on an assumption made by the 
CreditMetrics methodology. This methodology makes an a-priori distinction of the 
factors that determine the changes in the value of the assets of the borrowers. This 
distinction comes from two basic components: the market component and the 
idiosyncratic component. By definition, the idiosyncratic component does not 
correlate with anything, since it refers to those factors unique for the debtor. But the 
market component can then be further disaggregated into several separate 
components that allow the portfolio diversification. 
 
rtotal = WM rmarket + WI rIdiosyncratic        (2) 
Where: 
WM: Percentage of returns explained by the market component6.  
rmarket: Market component of returns. 
WI : Percentage of returns explained by the idiosyncratic component. 
Iidiosyncratic: Idiosyncratic component of returns. 
 
Next, the market component of Returns can be defined as: 
rMarket=HArGDPGeographicallocation+(1-HA)rGDPSectorComposition                                                                      (3) 
Where: 
HA: Percentage of the market component explained by the GDP returns of the 
borrowers’ country (geographical location). The determination of HA will be explained 
in Section 3. 
rGDPGeographicalLocation: Borrower’s country (geographical location) GDP’s return. 
(1-HA): Percentage of market component explained by the GDP returns’ of the 
borrower’ s sectoral activity.  
rGDPSectorComposition: Borrower’s sectoral activity GDP’s return. 
 
 
                                                
6 In the CreditMetrics technical document, how these weights can be calculated is explained. After 
empirical implementations, an acceptable value of WM = 70% is derived. For our exercise, we also 
assume this value. 
 
 
 
− 10 − 
Once all the elements that compose the market component of assets’ returns have 
been considered, the next step is to calculate the correlations between the 
borrowers’ loans making up a credit portfolio.  
 
Given a pair of borrowers, classified under ratings X and Y, whose sectoral activities 
are B and V; located in A and E country groups, and with returns expressed in the 
following way: 
 
r w r w H r w H rX IX IX MX A A MX A B= + + −( )1       
  
r w r w H r w H rY IY IY MY E E MY E V= + + −( )1  
 
The problem of estimating the correlations among each couple of borrowers in the 
portfolio is summarised in the following way: 
 
BVEMYAMXAEEMYAMXXY HwHwHwHw ρρρ )1()1( −−+=      (4)  
 
Where: 
pAE: is the correlation between different country groups. 
pBV: is the correlation between different sectoral activities. 
 
This equation is computed for each pair of borrowers making up the portfolio. The 
results of computing this equation are compiled in a (n x n) square matrix, where n is 
the number of loans in the portfolio. This matrix is named the correlation matrix 
between borrowers and is unique for each portfolio. This matrix is a key variable for 
the simulation of unexpected losses, since it incorporates the necessary elements to 
quantify the concentration/diversification of the portfolio.  
 
As explained above, the transition matrix indicates the probabilities of quality 
changes that a stand-alone exposure with a given rating might experience. 
Additionally, when correlations of quality changes between borrowers are involved, 
we can compute the joint likelihood of credit up(down)grades between the loans 
making up a portfolio.  
 
Debtors with similar characteristics will tend to migrate jointly to different credit 
qualities when hit by economic shocks. Debtors with different characteristics will tend 
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to migrate separately to different credit qualities when hit by economic shocks. This 
implies that credit portfolios concentrated in credits with similar characteristics will 
tend to have higher unexpected losses since they will not be diversifying the possible 
economic risks.  
 
With these components, we show in the following section how quality scenarios for 
the portfolio are simulated. From these quality scenarios, the loss distribution is built 
from which it is possible to obtain an estimate of unexpected losses. 
 
 
3.2.3 Simulation of Quality Scenarios for the Credit Portfolio. 
 
Combining the transition matrix with the correlation matrix between borrowers, and 
under the Merton framework that assumes lognormal asset returns (see equation 
(1)), we obtain the joint likelihood of credit quality migration and simulate credit 
quality scenarios. The simulated quality changes of the components of the portfolio 
allow us to estimate the losses or profits that determine the P&L distribution of the 
portfolio. 
 
In order to generate these scenarios, the following process is undertaken:  
1. Generation of random uniform numbers. 
2. Transformation of such random numbers into normal standard random 
numbers. 
3. Transformation of the normal standard random numbers into normal-
multivariated random numbers with a correlation matrix defined by the 
correlations between creditors. 
 
 
3.2.4 Valuation, P&L Distribution and Unexpected Losses. 
 
Once the credit portfolio quality scenarios have been simulated, we use the 
simulated credit quality scenarios to re-evaluate the portfolio exposures as explained 
in section I.2. With the portfolio exposures re-evaluated, we obtain the P&L 
distribution for the portfolio. 
 
This is done by computing the losses/gains that come from the difference between 
initial and final credit qualities in the loans making up the portfolio. The losses/gains 
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obtained from the simulation process are used to build a histogram. This histogram 
summarizes the loss distribution of the credit portfolio.  
 
 
Figure 3: Credit Portfolio Simulated P&L Distribution. 
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-32
.28
-30
.58
-28
.88
-27
.18
-25
.48
-23
.79
-22
.09
-20
.39
-18
.69
-16
.99
-15
.29
-13
.59
-11
.89
-10
.19 -8.
49
-6.
80
-5.
10
-3.
40
-1.
70 0.0
0
1.7
0
 
 
 
From this distribution a Value at Risk (VaR) is defined from which we obtain the 
amount of unexpected losses from the portfolio. The unexpected losses divided by 
the total amount of the portfolio represent the percentage that with a given probability 
(defined by the chosen percentile) could be lost in an extreme event. Capital 
requirements should be such that they can cover these losses. 
 
 
4. Empirical Implementation and Results. 
 
Our objective here is to try to reconstruct a typical bank portfolio for a country and 
then, holding the presumed loan book unchanged over time, (i.e. replacing failed 
loans with loans of a similar quality), to examine how the capital adequacy 
requirements (CAR’s) for the banks would have varied over time.  We have assumed 
that each portfolio consisted of 1000 loans, each one with equal exposure. Below we 
explained the assumptions taken for the additional variables that were needed to 
perform this exercise. We also indicate the databases from which the necessary 
information was taken. 
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4.1 Data and Assumptions. 
 
Geographical distribution of exposures: 
From the BIS database on consolidated banking claims for the U.S. and Norway, we 
obtained the through time proportion of assets invested in different geographical 
areas7. Information for Mexico was obtained from the databases provided by the 
Mexican Financial Regulatory Agency (CNBV). 
 
Credit quality distribution of exposures: 
We obtained the through time proportion of corporate bonds that were classified 
under each of the reported ratings for the U.S. from the Moody’s investors service 
database. In the case of Mexico and Norway, we obtained the through time 
proportion of corporate bonds that were classified under each of the reported ratings 
from the databases provided by the Mexican Financial Regulatory Agency and the 
Norwegian Central Bank. 
 
Sectoral Activity distribution of exposures: 
We assumed that the simulated portfolios consisted of loans evenly distributed 
across the major sectoral activities that comprise GDP8. 
 
Transition matrices: 
We use Moody’s data on U.S. corporate bonds, included on Moody’s Investors 
Service, Credit Risk Calculator.  In the event we also used data provided by the 
Mexican Financial Regulatory Agency and the Norwegian Central Bank on Corporate 
Loans. The Mexican data incorporates information between 1995 to 2000, and the 
Norwegian data incorporates information between 1988 to 2001.  
 
Loss Given Default: 
We fixed this at 50% in order to make results comparable to the IRB foundation 
approach developed by the Basel Committee. 
                                                
7 Developing: Africa and the Middle East; Asia and Pacific; developing Europe; Latin America. 
Developed: EU (non-EMU); EMU; Other Industrial; offshore centres.   
8 We included the following sectoral activities: financial, building, mining, information technology, 
retail, textile, chemical, energy, pharmaceutical, tobacco, food production, beverages, electrical. 
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Market component of returns: 
 
In equation (3) we assume that firms’ market component of returns are explained by 
both the firms’ sectoral activities and geographical locations. In order to get a proxy 
of the percentage of the market component of returns that is explained by 
geographical location (1-HA), we run the following OLS regressions: 
 
rMarket = C+B rGDPGeographicalLocation  + є                                                                        (5) 
Where: 
C: is a drift term 
rMarket: was obtained by estimating the returns of the Morgan Stanley Capital International 
(MSCI) indexes for major sectoral activities9.  
rGDPGeographicalLocation: was obtained by estimating GDP growth rates of the analysed 
countries. 
 
In general, in regression analysis, the percentage of the total variation of a 
dependent variable that is explained by the assumed explanatory variables is 
indicated by the measure of goodness of fit, R2 (explained sum of squares over total 
sum of squares). Therefore, we took the R2 that was obtained by running the 
regressions specified in equation (5) as proxies for the percentage of market returns 
that is explained by the GDP growth rates of the analysed countries, e.g., we take 
R2~(1-HA). Consequently, (1- R2) ~HA. 
 
 
Correlations among different country groups and economic activities: 
In equation (4), we make use of AEρ , the correlation between different country 
groups and BVρ , the correlation between different sectoral activities. The first were 
computed using the spreads of syndicated loans for each country group. We 
assumed that such spreads measure the riskiness of the financial system in each 
                                                
9 These indexes are composed as weighted averages of prices of the major corporates in developed 
economies for specific sectorial activities. The sectorial activities that we considered were: financial, 
building, mining, information technology, retail, textile, chemical, energy, pharmaceutical, tobacco, 
food production, beverages, electrical. Source: Datastream. 
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country group. The latter were computed from indices of the major sectorial activities 
examined in the exercise10.  
 
We used the variables and assumptions described in this section to perform the 
simulation of credit quality scenarios with which we re-evaluated the exposures in the 
portfolio and computed the P&L of the portfolio. 
 
 
Simulation: 
 
In this application, we programmed an algorithm to compute 10,000 possible quality 
scenarios for each of the (n x n) couples of the loans that make up the portfolio. Each 
quality scenario shows a change in the market value of the borrowers’ assets whose 
loans compose the portfolio. Since it was assumed that the process that generates 
changes in the assets’ log-returns follow a normal distribution, we use a normal-
multivariated distribution to generate joint quality migrations.  
 
                                                
10 Idem footnote 9. 
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4.2 Results. 
 
The results of this exercise for the three countries examined are stark.  We have 
simulated the time paths of CARs under each of our three approaches, standardised, 
IRB Foundation (IRB F) and ICRM, for our various countries, and the results are set 
out in Tables 3 to 5, and Charts 1 to 3.   
 
Table 3: CARs for the USA 
PERIOD Standardised IRB F ICRM 
1982 9.597967 8.591044 8.070189 
1983 8.933900 7.185306 6.802057 
1984 8.933900 7.624870 7.032411 
1985 9.133900 8.024912 7.262765 
1986 9.463390 9.989917 8.736384 
1987 9.463930 9.824500 8.545390 
1988 9.463930 8.659141 6.990717 
1989 9.563390 10.804149 6.488127 
1990 9.563390 11.677029 7.601025 
1991 9.986339 11.434979 7.541649 
1992 9.687739 8.064210 6.470195 
1993 9.287739 6.468979 4.665018 
1994 8.901877 5.395182 3.783256 
1995 8.507394 5.561594 4.087216 
1996 8.246774 5.646111 4.316443 
1997 8.294313 5.940010 4.837646 
1998 8.312774 6.508256 5.831926 
1999 8.403155 7.810893 6.704727 
2000 8.410316 8.126805 7.163834 
2001 8.531238 8.245881 7.242604 
2002 8.312375 8.180511 6.779526 
2003 8.107739 6.603000 6.258685 
Average 8.959430 8.016694 6.509627 
Variance 0.339964 3.392352 1.945790 
 
 
Chart 1: CARs for the USA 
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Table 4: CARs for Norway 
PERIOD Standardised IRB F ICRM 
1989 9.991635 8.311481 7.580115
1990 10.265155 9.275921 8.127573
1991 10.465155 9.781705 8.675031
1992 10.367155 9.929912 9.034373
1993 10.265155 9.523779 9.186305
1994 10.940239 13.235447 9.821542
1995 11.320031 14.06617011.082487
1996 10.669155 12.141937 9.722593
1997 10.265155 8.857323 7.317353
1998 10.265155 9.001267 7.422621
1999 10.265155 9.218641 7.527889
2000 10.265430 9.486551 7.930505
2001 10.360916 9.648655 8.333122
2002 10.461360 9.764866 8.343509
Average 10.440489 10.160261 8.578930
Variance 0.113401 2.941614 1.190491
 
 
 
Chart 2: CARs for Norway 
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Table 5: CARs for Mexico 
PERIOD Standardised IRB F ICRM 
Mar-95 8.765096 13.86423010.462123
Jun-95 9.221855 16.65079012.285877
Sep-95 9.299730 17.10300912.714591
Dec-95 9.493498 18.15147012.820000
Mar-96 9.251044 17.06754212.589874
Jun-96 9.494958 18.44856113.248221
Sep-96 9.557249 19.41584314.891864
Dec-96 10.303734 24.23094217.645355
Mar-97 9.430354 19.08871415.153354
Jun-97 9.273425 17.50091113.895955
Sep-97 9.396601 18.25420114.344051
Dec-97 8.928781 15.19411614.796451
Mar-98 8.813186 14.39793213.673818
Jun-98 8.851211 14.42816012.256023
Sep-98 9.058278 15.54539411.622476
Dec-98 9.040916 15.45623411.797630
Mar-99 9.052107 15.51928212.003802
Jun-99 8.981783 15.29660812.251375
Sep-99 9.135013 15.97926512.725803
Dec-99 8.968905 15.34540912.100842
Average 9.215886 16.84693113.163974
Variance 0.122662 5.644965 2.588205
 
 
Chart 3: CARs for Mexico 
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The important result to observe is the much greater variance of the simulated 
outcomes for the IRB than for the standardised or ICRM approaches.  During periods 
of strong growth, high profits and low NPLs, (USA in the mid 1990s and Norway in 
1997), the IRB has a lower CAR than the standardised approach in all our developed 
countries; whereas in recessions, (e.g. USA in 1990/91, Mexico mid 1995/96 and 
Norway in 1994/1995), the CAR is markedly higher for the IRB than in the other two 
approaches.  In Mexico, an emerging market economy (EME), the average quality of 
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loan is lower throughout than in developed countries, so the IRB gives a higher CAR 
in all years, but, as in developed countries, the variance of the CAR (up in recessions 
as in 1995/96, and lower during the better years) is greater for the IRB than in the 
other two approaches. 
 
It follows that the % change in the required CAR under the IRB as a country moves 
from boom to recession (up) and back to boom again (down) will be much more 
extreme under the IRB than under the other two approaches.  This is shown in Table 
6. 
Table 6: Maximum % Change in CARs 
 
A.  IRB Upwards Downwards 
 1 Period Date 
2 Consecutive 
 Periods Dates 1 Period Date 
2 Consecutive 
 Periods Dates 
USA 0.25 1989 0.33 1989/90 -0.29 1992 -0.49 1992/93
NORWAY 0.39 1994 0.45 1994/95 -0.27 1997 -0.41 1996/97
MEXICO 0.25 Dec 96 0.30 
Sep/Dec 
96 -0.21 Mar 97 -0.30 
Mar/Jun 
97 
 
B.  ICRM Upwards Downwards 
 1 Period Date 
2 Consecutive 
 Periods Dates 1 Period Date 
2 Consecutive 
 Periods Dates 
USA 0.21 1998 0.33 1998/99 -0.28 1993 -0.47 1993/94 
NORWAY 0.13 1995 0.20 1994/95 -0.25 1997 -0.37 1996/98 
MEXICO 0.18 Dec-96 0.30 
Sep/Dec 
96 -0.14 Mar-97 -0.22 
Mar/Jun 
97 
 
C. Stand Upwards Downwards 
 
1 
Period Date 
2 Consecutive 
 Periods Dates 1 Period Date 
2 Consecutive 
 Periods Dates 
USA 0.04 Jun-05 0.06 1985/86 -0.07 1983 -0.09 1994/95 
NORWAY 0.07 Jun-05 0.10 1994/95 -0.06 1997 -0.10 1996/97 
MEXICO 0.08 Dec-96 0.08 
Sep/Dec 
96 -0.08 Mar-97 -0.10 
Mar/Jun 
97 
 
 
5. Conclusions. 
 
The implication of the results of this excercise is that procyclicality may well still be a 
serious problem with Basel II, even after the smoothing of the risk curves that were 
introduced between Consultative Papers 2 and 3 produced by the Basel Committee 
to mitigate this problem.  However there will be other potentially offsetting factors.  
Banks normally keep buffers above the required minimum CARs, both for their 
protection against sanctions should the minimum be infringed and to satisfy ratings 
agencies, and these buffers are likely to be raised during booms when IRB CARs 
may fall to extremely low levels.  Note, however, that we have used Moody’s data for 
the U.S.A. from1982 to 2003, for Norway  from 1988 to 2001 and for Mexico from 
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1995 to 2000, which are already supposed to be averaged over the cycle, whereas 
most commercial banks are, so we are told by several of them, likely to use point-in-
time ratings, which could worsen pro-cyclicality yet further. 
 
Basel II will be a regime change, and one of the purposes of this is to make bankers 
more conscious of risk assessment and risk management.  It has already succeeded 
in this.  One hope is that it will induce bankers to be more prudent during booms 
despite declines in CARs.  An implication of a move from the standardised to an IRB 
approach is that the individual bank making this transition will be encouraged to shift 
its portfolio to higher-quality, higher rated credits, because it then benefits from a 
lower CAR.  This is good of itself, but the higher the quality the credit, the steeper is 
the risk curve, (relating quality to required risk ratio); so the procyclicality is likely to 
be enhanced, even if average quality improves. 
 
When a regime change is introduced, no one in truth can predict its ramifications, 
certainly not us.  Nevertheless these simulations suggest that procyclicality could 
remain a serious concern.  It is even possible that with the advent of a serious 
downturn, if one was to occur, the impact of abiding by the IRB would be too severe 
for the authorities in some countries to countenance.  Perhaps like the Stability and 
Growth Pact it would only be observed in the breach when it began to bite hard.  
Possibly an even greater worry might be that the adoption of Basel II, while not being 
so adverse as to force reconsideration, might yet exacerbate future capital 
fluctuations. 
 
Certainly there remains a tension between relating CARs more closely to underlying 
risks in individual banks, and in trying for macro-economic purposes to encourage 
contra-cyclical variations in bank lending in aggregate.  How to square this circle 
must, however, be a subject for future research. 
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